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THE VALUE OF RISK: MEASURING THE SERVICE OUTPUT
OF U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS
SUSANTO BASU, ROBERT INKLAAR and J. CHRISTINA WANG∗
Banks often charge implicitly for their services via interest spreads, instead of
explicit fees. Much of bank output thus has to be estimated indirectly. In contrast
to current statistical practice, dynamic optimizing models of banks argue that compen-
sation for bearing systematic risk is not part of bank output. We apply these models
and find that in the U.S. National Accounts between 1997 and 2007, bank output was
overestimated by 21% and gross domestic product (GDP) by 0.3%. Compared with cur-
rent methods, our new estimates imply more plausible estimates of the income share of
capital and the return on fixed capital of the banking industry. (JEL E01, E44, O47)
I. INTRODUCTION
Services are an increasingly important part
of modern economies, both in terms of size
and for their contribution to economic growth.
However, the output data for many of these ser-
vices is notoriously weak, and this is particularly
the case for banking.1 This makes it hard to
determine the sources of economic growth and
even the size of the economy. A major barrier
to progress in this area has been the inade-
quacy of production models for banks. Wang,
Basu, and Fernald (2009, WBF henceforth) pro-
pose a general-equilibrium model of interactions
between banks, firms, and consumers to rem-
edy this problem. In this paper, we estimate
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the value of output of U.S. banks following the
prescriptions of the WBF model for the period
1997–2007. We find that these new estimates
differ considerably from those based on cur-
rent National Accounts methods: bank output
is reduced by 21% and gross domestic product
(GDP) is reduced by 0.3%. We argue that com-
pared to current National Accounts, these new
output estimates imply a more plausible capital
share in income and internal rate of return (IRR)
on fixed capital.
Measuring the value of bank output is chal-
lenging, as much of bank service output is not
explicitly priced. Instead, the implicit charges
for financial services are bundled with inter-
est flows between banks and their customers,
chiefly borrowers and depositors. WBF show
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how implicit service revenue can be unbundled
from gross interest flows by applying the idea
from financial intermediation theory that the
main service provided by banks in making loans
is reducing asymmetric information between
borrowers and lenders through screening and
monitoring. Instead of receiving an upfront
fee for these services, an optimizing bank can
charge a higher interest rate than the rate avail-
able on a market security with otherwise the
same risk attributes.
This procedure contrasts with the typical
statistical practice in Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development coun-
tries.2 According to current national accounts
guidelines, banks’ implicit revenue from lend-
ing services (per unit of loan balance) equals
the spread between the gross loan interest rate
and a risk-free rate.3 This in effect treats loan
risk premia (i.e., the return differential between
a risk-free and the equally risky fixed-income
security) as part of banks’ value added. A pro-
ducing firm’s measured output will thus fall if
it switches from market debt to bank loans, or
will appear to rise if it starts issuing bonds rather
than borrowing from banks, even if the under-
lying risk of the firm remains the same.
According to the WBF model, the implicit
revenue from screening and monitoring services
should equal the spread of the gross loan interest
rate over the yield on an equally risky fixed-
income security, not a risk-free security such
as a Treasury bill or bond. This accounting
method treats the risk premium as part of the
borrowing firms’ cost of capital and hence
as part of households’ capital income, their
compensation for bearing risk. A key advantage
of this method is that it leads to a uniform
treatment of risk premia on all debt instruments,
so that nonfinancial firms’ output is invariant to
their source of debt finance—markets or banks.
In this paper, we implement a new model-
implied measure of bank output for U.S. com-
mercial banks. To highlight the role of risk, this
paper focuses on new estimates of the nom-
inal value of services associated with loans,
where our risk-based user-cost approach differs
substantially from current practice. Despite our
conservative estimate of risk premia, we show
that imputed bank output is overstated by 45%
on average in the U.S. National Income and
2. For a discussion of the current method used in the
United States, see Fixler, Reinsdorf and Smith (2003).
3. See SNA (1993, 6.128).
Product Accounts (NIPA). This translates into
an overstatement of total bank output, which
includes explicit fees and commissions, of 21%.
Netting out the lending services to nonfinan-
cial firms, which are counted as an intermediate
input, this finding implies that U.S. GDP would
have been 0.3% lower on average over our sam-
ple period of 1997–2007.
A number of plausibility checks also argue
in favor of our output measure. First, we com-
pare the share of capital in banks’ value added
with the share of capital in the total private econ-
omy and other industries. Under current practice,
banks show up as more (fixed) capital-intensive
than petroleum refining, whereas our estimates
suggest a capital share closer to the share of cap-
ital in the overall private sector. In addition, cur-
rent practice implies an IRR on fixed assets that
is 8 percentage points higher than the rate in the
private sector as a whole.4 Our new estimates
imply an internal rate that is, on average, slightly
lower than the rate in the overall private sector.
This is more consistent with the basic principle
that the IRR on fixed assets should not vary much
across industries as long as capital is mobile.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. We
begin with a brief review of the theory-implied
new output measure, focusing on the role of risk.
We then discuss data and present our results. We
conclude with a summary, and discuss directions
for future research.
II. THE MODEL FOR IMPLICIT BANK SERVICE
OUTPUT
This section reviews briefly the dynamic
stochastic optimizing models of banks in Wang
(2003) and WBF (2009), focusing on their impli-
cations for imputing the value of bank services
that are not explicitly charged for.5 The key con-
clusion of these studies regarding output mea-
surement is that implicit compensation for bank
services can be inferred from a bank’s total
income by netting out the pure risk-based returns
(i.e., costs of funds) on assets and liabilities held
by the bank. To impute the cost of funds on
any such risky financial instrument, one should
4. Differences in systematic risk between industries can
explain differences in the internal rate of return; see Section
II. However, our loan risk premium estimates and stock
market betas suggest that an 8% risk premium is excessive.
5. WBF (2009) extend Wang’s partial equilibrium model
to a general equilibrium setting, and demonstrate that all the
qualitative results in the study of Wang (2003) continue to
hold. Interested readers who wish to pursue the theoretical
issues in greater detail are referred to those studies.
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FIGURE 1


















rA: (Average) interest rate received on loans
rM : Expected rate of return required on market securities
with the same (systematic) risk characteristics as
the loans
rF : Risk-free rate
rD: Interest rate paid on deposits
YA: Nominal output of bank services to borrowers
YD : Nominal output of bank services to depositors
For a more detailed decomposition, see Wang (2003).
use the rate of return on (debt) securities sub-
ject to the same risk, but without any services
attached. Total income net of the pure costs of
funds then measures the true value of bank ser-
vices implicitly charged for. This conclusion is
summarized in Figure 1, which shows graphi-
cally how we impute the value of bank services
related to loans (YA) and deposits (YD) using
data on the interest rate paid on deposits (rD),
the interest rate charged on loans (rA), and mar-
ket interest rates on risk-free securities (rF ) and
risky securities (rM ). This section outlines the
theoretical arguments for choosing these particu-
lar interest rates while the next section discusses
our empirical implementation.
A. Implicit Bank Services—The Case of
Lending6
Before any attempt to measure, one must
first define a concept. So, what is the output of
6. For exposition of the theory, we focus on bank
lending services because the measurement problem is made
harder by the fact that the implicit revenue from services is
banks? Wang (2003) and WBF (2009) answer
this question through models that embed optimal
bank operations within the context of competi-
tive financial markets. These papers recognize
that the value added of banks lies in resolving
information problems and processing transac-
tions, not in generating returns on the resulting
financial instruments. These returns are deter-
mined entirely by the instruments’ risk char-
acteristics and market interest rates. In partic-
ular, in these models the value added of bank
lending consists of screening and monitoring
activities to mitigate asymmetric information
problems with regard to borrowers’ creditwor-
thiness.7 Bank services are analogous to other
professional business services, such as legal,
accounting and consulting services, and indeed
analogous to all production in the economy: out-
put is generated through a production process
that uses primary inputs of labor and capital,
as well as intermediate inputs (such as office
supplies and utilities).
In contrast, the purely risk-based returns that
accrue to the stock of financial instruments held
by banks are what investors would demand on
any contingent claims with the same risk pro-
files, regardless of how they are created. These
pure returns also correspond to the concept of
the “user cost of funds,” defined as the (risky)
future payoff from investment that compensates
suppliers of funds for their forgone current con-
sumption and for bearing risk, but not for any
attached services.8 The costs of funds are part of
the overall user cost of capital faced by the ulti-
mate users of funds, such as nonfinancial firms.
These are therefore part of those firms’ value
added, not the value added of the banks that
provide the funds.
bundled with risk-based asset (i.e., loan) returns. See Wang
(2003) for detailed accounting of services to depositors.
In the empirical application, we also measure services to
depositors.
7. Banks’ role in resolving information asymmetry is
well recognized in the financial intermediation literature
(e.g., see the survey by Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993).
More recently, Allen and Santomero (2001) broaden the
scope to recognize intermediaries’ role as providers of
specialized financial expertise. This can be interpreted as
a form of transaction facilitation and thus encompassed in
our definition of bank value added.
8. This can be viewed as an extension to what is often
referred to as the “user-cost” framework. Diewert (1974)
was one of the first to introduce this framework and Barnett
(1978) first applies it to financial assets, introducing the
concept of “user cost of money.” The key element of our
extension is that it takes account of risk, that is, in the
real world where the reward to essentially all investment
is uncertain, the so-called “opportunity cost of money” is
comparable across securities only after adjusting for risk.
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This paper concentrates on the measurement
of nominal bank output, but to understand the
models of Wang (2003) and WBF (2009), it is
useful to consider briefly the concept of real out-
put implied by these models. Real bank (lend-
ing) output consists of intermediation services
that certify borrowers as credit-worthy at loan
origination (screening) and on an on-going basis
(monitoring). Thus, a natural measure of real
bank output is the number of loans originated
and monitored, just as a natural measure of the
output of a “normal” service provider, like a
barbershop, is the number of haircuts it pro-
vides. In principle, certain types of loans (e.g.,
small business loans) may require more informa-
tion processing than others (such as conforming
mortgages). Thus, a refined measure of real out-
put would augment the raw transactions count
with some notion of “quantity of service,” just
as a high-quality coiffure by Christophe of Los
Angeles9 should be counted as being “more hair-
cut output” than a haircut from the local barber
shop. But in any measure of real bank output,
the natural starting point is the number of trans-
actions of each type performed.
Inklaar and Wang (2007) count these trans-
actions and aggregate them into an index of
real bank output. The object of this paper, of
course, is to measure nominal bank output accu-
rately. In conjunction, these two papers imply a
complete set of national income measures for
banking—nominal output, real output, and an
implicit price index for banking services.
B. Loan-Interest-Rate Spread—Risk versus
Implicit Bank Services
The key measurement implication of Wang
(2003) and WBF (2009) is that the nominal
value of bank services that are not explicitly
charged for can be imputed as total income net
of the purely risk-based returns on the financial
claims created by those services and held on the
bank’s book. In the case of lending services, the
pure cost of funds of a loan should be inferred
using the rate of return on a market debt security
with the same risk characteristics (but without
any services attached).
This method of matching risk is of the same
nature as a common application of asset-pricing
theory to corporate finance—the cost of cap-
ital for a specific investment project is set to
9. Who famously cut Bill Clinton’s hair on Air Force
One at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX).
equal the rate of return on “like” market securi-
ties. Both of these applications follow the same
principle as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory in the
work of Ross (1976), where the expected rate
of return on a portfolio is determined given the
returns on “factor” portfolios and the absence of
arbitrage opportunities.10 One obvious implica-
tion is that no firm—and no bank—would use
the return on risk-free securities as the appro-
priate opportunity cost for an investment with
risky payoff.
The logic of removing risk-adjusted returns
from total bank income to impute the value
of service output can be illustrated with a
stylized example of “the bank that does noth-
ing.”11 Specifically, assume frictionless finan-
cial markets, so that firms can borrow directly
from households without the need for intermedi-
aries to process information or transactions. The
required (net) rate of return on any investment
between periods t and t + 1, denoted r˜t+1 (with
the tilde emphasizing the random nature of the
return), is determined by a stochastic discount
factor, denoted mt+1, as follows:
Et [(1 + r˜t+1)mt+1] = 1.(1)
Assume entities that function solely as
accounting vehicles are set up as follows12:
households transfer their capital to these entities
in exchange for claims on the entities, which
then rent the capital to production firms. By
design, these entities have balance sheets and
income statements that look like those of banks,
so they are called banks for short even though
they perform no services.
For simplicity of exposition, we assume these
banks are fully equity funded. However, note
that the banks’ capital structure is irrelevant for
their cost of capital in this simple model econ-
omy as here the Modigliani and Miller (MM,
1958) theorem applies. More generally, Wang
(2003) showed that the central message that the
user cost of funds must take risk into account
does not depend on whether the MM theorem
10. These are all examples of the so-called relative
approach to asset pricing: the value of a specific risky
investment is determined taking the value of all the other
assets as given. See Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) for
other applications of this relative approach. One prominent
example is pricing options.
11. See WBF (2009) for a more detailed illustration in
a general-equilibrium framework.
12. The real-world analogy is a so-called special pur-
pose vehicle, which is a pure financing arrangement off the
balance sheet of the sponsoring institution. It involves vir-
tually no operational activities.
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holds. What remains is the practical matter of
finding the market rates most commensurate
with the risk of financial instruments held by
banks, as we discuss later in detail.
Now look at the cash flow of a representative
bank. Households recognize that a bank here is
just a bookkeeping device and that they ulti-
mately own its assets—capital used in produc-
tion. So they require the same rate of return on a
bank’s equity as on those assets. The bank must
therefore lend the funds to any firm at a rate set
according to Equation (1). Consequently, pro-
duction firms face the same cost of capital as
they would have if they had borrowed directly
from households. Let rit ≡ Et(r˜ it+1) denote the
expected rate of return on the loan to firm i
with balance Ait ; further denote total balance of
the loan portfolio as At and the average rate of
return on the portfolio as rAt . Then the expected

















wi = Ait/At is the weight of loan i in the portfo-
lio. Note that rAt At is also the expected dividend
payment to the households who own the bank.
The correctly imputed value of bank ser-
vice output should be zero on average as
by design the banks produce no real ser-
vices.13 This is exactly the result if the value
of services is imputed as the bank’s total
income net of its risk-adjusted cost of funds,
that is, At(rˆAt+1 − rAt ) ≈ 0, because rˆAt+1 − rAt =∑
i wi(rˆ
i
t+1 − rit ) ≈ 0, where rˆ it+1 and rˆAt+1 =∑
i wi rˆ
i
t+1 are the realized rate of return on loan
i and on the portfolio, respectively.
In contrast, if the value of services is
imputed by subtracting risk-free returns from
total income, as in the existing national income
accounting practices, then on average the bank
will be credited with producing positive out-
put of services, as in general the expectation of
rˆAt+1 − rFt ≈ rAt − rFt > 0.14 This result follows
13. To the extent the portfolio is sufficiently diversified
and the persistence in aggregate shocks is accounted for,
realized returns averaged across firms should basically equal
the conditional expectation.
14. The mirror image of this over-counting of bank
output is the under-counting of borrowing firms’ out-
put—reduced on average by (rAt − rFt ) simply because of
the change in accounting method.
directly from expanding Equation (1), which
applies to rit and hence also to rAt , and substi-
tuting 1 + rFt for 1/Et(mt+1) (which is itself an
application of Equation [1] to risk-free assets):
rAt = (1 + rFt )[1 + cov(r˜At+1,−mt+1)] − 1,
(3)
where rFt is the yield on a debt of the same matu-
rity but not subject to any risk (e.g., default), nor
with any embedded options.15 U.S. Treasury’s
are the best example.16 rFt only compensates
investors for sacrificing current for future con-
sumption with certainty. A security with risky
payoff that cannot be diversified away and is
(negatively) correlated with the stochastic dis-
count factor, however, must in expectation pay
a return premium cov(r˜t+1,−mt+1), to make up
for the risk-induced disutility.17 This premium
is positive for almost all risky assets (see any
finance text, e.g., Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay
1997).
This stylized example serves to intuitively
highlight the conceptual problem of using the
risk-free rate to impute bank output. Wang
(2003) and WBF (2009) show that similar
overestimation of bank output arises in the
realistic case where banks provide actual ser-
vices—processing information and trans-
actions—for which no explicit fees are charged
but implicit compensation is earned via an
interest-rate spread.
To infer the value of such implicitly priced
services as part of banks’ net interest income,
Wang (2003) solves for the optimal interest rate
charged by a value-maximizing bank when mak-
ing loans with the same (systematic) risk profile
as a type of existing market debt. The usual
first-order condition gives rise to the following
expression for the rate of return (denoted rAt ) the
bank should expect to earn on a loan portfolio:
rAt = rMt + rSt .(4)
15. Yields on bonds must be adjusted for the embedded
option to be comparable with those on option-free debt
instruments. Bonds that allow prepayment, such as MBS,
essentially have an embedded call option.
16. They are typically considered risk-free in that they
earn a guaranteed return, rFt , if the debt is held until
maturity. Note that even for this type of debt there is still
interest rate risk, that is, the holding-period return is almost
surely uncertain if one sells it prior to the maturity date.
17. In the consumption-capital asset pricing model,
which can be expressed as a specific case of Equation
(1), this means assets with payoff positively correlated with
consumption growth have to pay a positive return premium.
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rMt ≡ Et(r˜Mt+1) is the expected rate of return
demanded by investors on the market debt with
the same risk. The rSt represents what we shall
call the service spread, which generates the extra
interest that compensates the bank implicitly
for processing the loan. The optimal service
spread rSt in Equation (4) satisfies the condition
that the extra interest receipt, rSt At , equals the(weighted average) marginal cost of processing
a loan multiplied by the optimal markup.18 This
markup is determined by competition in the loan
market.
In the nomenclature of the 1993 System
of National Accounts (SNA 1993), rMt in
Equation (4) is called the reference rate—
serving as reference for the cost of funds on
the loan. For a market rate to be the proper
reference, the security should not only have sim-
ilar risk, but banks should also face the same
marginal tax rate and transaction costs faced by
typical investors in the reference market debt.19
We argue that this is likely a reasonable assump-
tion for the reference rates used in our empirical
exercise, as most of the market securities chosen
as references for bank loans are backed by secu-
ritized pools of loans, such as mortgage-backed
securities (MBS), and the securities are routinely
held on bank balance sheet along with those
same categories of loans. That is, by revealed
choices of asset allocation, banks appear to con-
sider these securities as offering similar rates of
return as the corresponding categories of loans.
The reference rate for a portfolio of loans (of
varying types, maturities and rate-reset dates) is
then a weighted average of rates on the individ-
ual loans.
C. Imputing the Value of Implicit Bank Services
Derivations in the previous section imply
that, on average, a bank’s nominal output of
implicit lending services to borrowers should
equal rSt At = (rAt − rMt )At . But neither of the
expected rates of return, rAt and rMt , is observed.
So, for empirical estimations, we make use of
the relationship that the expected rate of return
18. That is, the bank charges an implicit price for its
intermediation service, equal to a markup on the marginal
cost of producing that service. The cost is determined by
a loan officer’s labor input in processing a loan, plus the
amount of physical capital and supplies used for that task.
19. For banks, additional distortions are introduced if
deposit insurance is not fully risk sensitive (see Wang 2003
for a detailed treatment). Here, we assume that deposit
insurance is fairly priced for the banking industry as a whole,
and ignore distributional effects.
on a defaultable debt equals its promised yield
to maturity (i.e., the contractual interest rate,
denoted by Rkt ) corrected for its expected loss
rate due to default (denoted by dkt )20:
rkt = Rkt − dkt , k = M,A.(5)
dkt ≡ Et( ˜dkt+1),where dkt is the (random) default
loss rate. For market securities, RMt ’s are gen-
erally observed while dMt ’s can be estimated
using time series data.21 For loans, dAt ’s can
be estimated as well, although RAt ’s are less
often observed. Substitute Equation (5) into
Equation (4) and we can impute the output of
lending services as22:
YAt = rSt At = [(RAt − dAt ) − (RMt − dMt )]At .
(6)
Previous discussions make it clear why the ref-
erence rate (rMt = RMt − dMt ) should be risk-
adjusted. Therefore, the reference rate varies
across loan types, depending on risk character-
istics of the loan or portfolio of loans associated
with the services considered.
In contrast, the U.S. NIPA currently impute
bank services to borrowers using a nearly risk-
free rate as the reference rate:
(rAt − rFt )At = (rSt + rPt )At = YAt + rPt At ,
(7)
where rPt = rMt − rFt is the return premium
of the reference risky market securities over
(maturity-matched) risk-free securities; it equals
(1 + rFt )cov(r˜Mt+1,−mt+1) (see Equation [3]
above).
The value of output imputed according to
Equation (7) will overstate the actual value of
service output. According to some, the informal
justification for Equation (7) is that rPt At is
regarded as compensation for rendering a so-
called “risk-bearing” service. Wang and Basu
(2007, Section 3.4) discuss at length why risk-
bearing is not a productive service according
to the conceptual framework of SNA 1993.
20. The dkt equals the product of the probability of
default (PD) and the expected loss rate given default. If
the latter is near 100%, then dkt is close to the PD. Wang(2003) details the distinction between promised yield and
expected rate of return. The equation here is exact only
for instantaneous returns, and is used as an approximation
in discrete-time cases. See Duffie and Singleton (2003) for
continuous-time models of defaultable debt pricing.
21. The conditional estimate of dMt , such as KMV’s
expected default frequency, is procyclical.
22. See WBF (2009) for a detailed discussion of how the
actual value in each period still deviates from this average.
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More importantly, they show that the NIPA’s
imputation results in inconsistent accounting of
the output of borrowing firms, by making firms’
measured value added depend on their sources
of funding. Suppose two firms are identical, but
one borrows from banks and the other from the
bond market. Then the firm relying on banks
is credited with producing lower value added
than the one issuing bonds, even if their actual
productive activities are identical.
The value of implicit depositor services can
be imputed in a similar manner to the new
way we imputed the value of implicit lending
services. Let Dt denote the deposit balance, and
rDt the interest rate paid; RMt and dMt are defined
as above (but the values almost certainly differ),
then nominal output of depositor services can be
imputed as:
YDt = [(RMt − dMt ) − rDt ]Dt .(8)
For insured deposits in the United States,
the relevant reference rate should be the risk-
free (Treasury) rate, that is, RMt = rMt = rFt , as
dMt = 0. For the remaining, uninsured, deposits,
RMt − dMt > rFt , because the deposit holders
are exposed to some (default) risk in bank
asset portfolios. In our empirical application, we
abstract from this issue and effectively assume
that all deposits are insured, and hence risk-free.
Note that Equation (6) implies that if a bank
passively holds market securities in its invest-
ment portfolio, there are no services provided to
the asset issuers (i.e., YA = 0), as RA = RM and
dA = dM . Likewise, Equation (8) implies zero
implicit services (i.e., YD = 0) provided to hold-
ers of bank term liabilities (commercial paper,
market bonds, and privately placed bonds), as
the interest rate paid equals the reference rate
(RD = RM and dD = dM ). Also note that under
virtually all circumstances (i.e., whenever there
are equity holders), (rM − dM ) in Equation (6)
is greater than its counterpart in Equation (8),
because bank assets are typically riskier than
bank liabilities. In other words, the reference
rates for imputing lending and depositor services
almost always differ by a positive margin.
So again, recall that Figure 1 illustrates the
imputed nominal output value of implicit bank
services. Note that only part of a bank’s net
interest income constitutes nominal output of
bank services; the remainder—corresponding to
the risk premium, (rM − rF )A—is excluded.23
23. As is shown, the balance of loans exceeds that of
deposits, with bank equity making up the difference. This
This is precisely because the reference rate
for lending services generally exceeds that for
depositor services. The risk premium, along
with actual interest expenses on bank liabilities,
constitutes a pure transfer of capital income. It
is part of the factor income generated by the
capital used in the borrowing firms’ production
or in the consumption of consumers. This factor
income is then transferred from the end users
of funds to the ultimate suppliers of funds—the
bank shareholders. Only when all investors are
risk neutral or all risk is idiosyncratic will this
risk premium disappear. Figure 1 illuminates
how our model-based output measure differs
from the NIPA’s current measure, which uses a
(nearly) risk-free rate as the single reference rate
(see Fixler, Reinsdorf, and Smith 2003).24 As
we have argued, the NIPA’s measure overstates
bank output by the amount of the risk premium.
In the remainder of this paper, we discuss how
to estimate the risk premium and its quantitative
impact on the measured output of the U.S.
commercial banking industry.
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF BANK
SERVICE INCOME
A. Data Sources
Accounting data for individual commercial
banks come from the Consolidated Reports of
Condition and Income (the Call Reports).25
These are quarterly financial statements filed by
banks to their regulators and made available
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Our
empirical estimates use data from the second
quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of 2007,
mostly because some of the necessary variables
are not available for earlier years.
The Call Reports data are used to estimate
the average interest rate earned by banks on each
category of loans and deposits. The Call Reports
also provide data on the repricing period of vari-
ous categories of loans. Yields on U.S. Treasury
figure is a simplified version of Figure 1 in Wang (2003),
as it ignores risk premia on deposits because of uninsured
deposits. That is, for deposits it sets rM = rF , and overstates
depositor services.
24. Specifically, it is a weighted average rate of return
on all U.S. Treasury securities held on banks’ book. So it
generally exceeds what is commonly viewed as the risk-free
rate—the 90-d Treasury bill rate—as banks also hold longer
term Treasury notes and bonds.
25. These correspond to the forms FFIEC 031-041; see
www.ffiec.gov for details.
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securities of varying maturities are from the Fed-
eral Reserve Board,26 as are yields on commer-
cial paper of the top two tiers of ratings; yields
on the remaining tiers are from Bloomberg.
Yields on mortgage- and asset-backed securi-
ties are based on indices constructed by Citi-
group Global Markets and Merrill Lynch (ML).
Finally, interest rates charged on commercial
and industrial (C&I) loans for clients with vari-
ous risk profiles come from the Federal Reserve
Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL).27
B. Implementation—Overview
The Call Reports afford no direct observation
of either the promised yield (RAt ) or the expected
default rate (dAt ). Instead, what is reported is
the average interest rate actually received by
banks on each individual category of loans and
securities, that is, RAt − ˆdAt+1, where ˆdAt+1 is the
realized default loss rate (indexed t+ 1 because
it becomes known only at the end of period t).
Plug this into Equation (6) and we can express
the service spread rSt as
rSt = [(RAt − ˆdAt+1) − (RMt − dMt )](9)
+ ( ˆdAt+1 − dAt ) ≈ (RAt − ˆdAt+1) − RMt
+ ( ˆdAt+1 − dAt ).
This is our basic formula for imputing the
value of implicitly priced services to borrowers.
As will be shown in the following text, the
expected default rate dMt is often considerably
lower than 1% for the market securities we use
for reference rates. Therefore, the service spread
can be inferred from the realized loan interest
rate and the matched market yield RMt , after
correcting for the deviation of the actual from
the expected rate of loan default. The empirical
estimate of each term will be detailed in turn.
The Call Reports data dictate that we can
match loans with market securities in only a
few broad categories: real estate loans with
MBS, consumer loans with asset-backed secu-
rities (ABS), and C&I loans with commercial
paper. So, the reference rate (rMt = RMt − dMt )
used for each category is a (noisy) proxy for the
true risk-matched reference rate, as we observe
26. Release H.15; see http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/h15/. We use the constant-maturity series.
27. Release E.2; see http://federalreserve.gov/releases/
e2/. For more information on banks’ internal risk rating,
see data reported in Form FR2028a/s, available from
1997 onward: http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
reportforms/ReportDetail.cfm?WhichFormId=FR 2028a/s.
little of the risk composition and only limited
information about the maturity of the loans and
thus cannot assess the accuracy of the match.
Nevertheless, using market debt returns almost
surely underestimate the true risk premium on
loans, as market securities on average have
much lower realized default rates and are there-
fore likely to command lower risk premia as
well.28
Another issue is that in each period we
observe only the average interest rate earned
by a bank on its portfolio of a given type of
loans, regardless of when the loans were priced.
In particular, for loans with long periods of
fixed rates, like mortgages, this loan portfolio
will also include loans that were priced years
ago. Comparing this average rate with current
market rates to impute the service spread is
obviously not correct. Unfortunately, the data
necessary for a proper matching—gross flows
of new loans originated and old loans paid off or
reset at a new interest rate in each period—are
not available. So, rather than trying to make
rough assumptions about the composition of the
loan portfolios, we compare the average interest
rate to the current market reference rates in our
baseline estimates.29
The one exception is C&I loans where we
use data from the STBL, which provides data
on the interest rate charged on new C&I loans
originated by commercial banks in the survey
week. In this case, we can match the timing
of bank loan interest rates and the market rate.
While still not perfect, this matching likely
provides a more accurate estimate of actual
service spreads than could be obtained by using
the difference between average bank loan rates
earned and current market reference rates.
Estimating depositor services according to
Equation (8) is straightforward, especially once
we assume rM = rF . This assumption is neces-
sary, because the Call Reports do not provide
adequate data for estimating the risk premium
on uninsured deposits, whose share is, fortu-
nately, modest.
To further implement Equation (8), the differ-
ence between the realized and expected default
rate should be added as part of the service
spread. We estimate these terms by using data
28. It is possible, but unlikely, that the systematic
component of risk, which determines the risk premium, is
still the same for loans and the matched securities.
29. This means that we estimate a market rate that would
be the theoretically correct reference rate if all the loans in
the portfolio had been (re)priced during the current period.
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from the Call Reports on charge-offs of the dif-
ferent loan categories. The expected default rate
is proxied by the period-average charge-off rate.
The only remaining piece of information is then
the risk premium of each loan category.
C. Estimates of Risk Premia
To facilitate comparison with the NIPAs’
current measure of bank output, we estimate
separately the two components—the risk-free
rate and the risk premium—of the reference rate
for each category of loans. The risk premium on
a reference security is30:
rPt = rMt − rFt = RMt − rFt − dMt .(10)
Data indicate that the unconditional estimate
of dMt , equal to the long-term average of realized
defaults, is extremely low for certain categories
of market debt, such as commercial paper. For
example, according to Moody’s, the historical
average default rates of commercial paper with
the top two rating grades (P-1 and P-2) are
basically nil.31 So, for certain categories of
loans, when such corporate debt is used as the
reference securities, a reasonable estimate of rPt
is simply the yield spread between such debt and
the maturity-matched Treasury securities (i.e.,
RMt − rFt ); the upward bias from ignoring dMt
should be negligible.
To compute the respective risk premium on
C&I loans, we rely on the Federal Reserve’s
STBL to gauge the default risk and maturity
composition of C&I loans and find the best
matched market securities.32 Data from this
survey indicate that about 70% of C&I loans
are repriced in less than a month and over
90% in less than a year. This suggests that
commercial paper is a more appropriate type
of reference security than corporate bonds. On
the other hand, using the yields on commercial
paper likely results in conservative estimates of
the risk premium on C&I loans, as C&I loans
30. For coupon bonds, rM and rF should in fact be
matched by duration, not maturity. However, because we
have no data on the durations of private-sector market debt,
we assume that the flow of their coupon payments is such
that each debt’s duration is similar to that of the maturity-
matched Treasury.
31. “For a 180-d period, these risks are estimated to
be 0.00% for P-1, 0.02% for P-2, 0.12% for P-3, and
0.43% for not prime (NP).” www.moodyskmv.com/research/
whitepaper/60917.pdf.
32. It is possible that the loans covered in the survey are
still not representative of the banking industry as a whole, or
at all times. But this is the best micro data source available,
and there is no reason to suspect systematic bias.
tend to have both longer average maturities and
greater default risk than commercial paper.33
Among the four risk categories reported in
the STBL, two have readily available reference
market securities. First, according to the filing
instructions, the “minimal-risk” classification
explicitly requires that the loans be to customers
with a bond rating of AA or higher; such firms
generally also carry a P-1 short-term rating
by Moody’s. Second, the “low-risk” category
requires customers to have a BBB bond rating,
which maps into a P-2 rating by Moody’s.34
However, the reference securities for the other
two, higher, risk categories, “moderate risk” and
“other,” are not as clear. So we assume that
the higher interest rate related to the “low-risk”
category is entirely as a result of greater risk but
not to extra implicit service revenue.
Over the sample period, the risk premia of
loans in the minimal-risk and low-risk categories
average 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points, corre-
sponding to the risk premia on P-1 and P-2
commercial paper, respectively. By comparison,
loans in the moderate-risk and the other-risk cat-
egories carry considerably higher average risk
premia: 1.4 and 2.3 percentage points, respec-
tively.35 As the latter two categories on aver-
age account for 60% of the volume of new
C&I loans reported in the STBL, the weighted
average risk premium for all C&I loans is
1.3 percentage points in our time series. This
weighted average is computed using the volume
of new loans in each category as weights.
Instead of assuming that higher interest rates
on moderate risk and other C&I loans are
fully because of higher risk premia, we could
also assume they are fully because of higher
information processing costs. This would imply
using the commercial paper spread for low-
risk C&I loans as the market reference rate for
the moderate-risk and other categories. Doing
so would reduce the overall risk premium
from 1.3 to 0.5 percentage points and almost
double the average service spread from 0.9
33. The match is not improved by using asset-backed
commercial-paper (ABCP) which some would argue is a
better reference for secured bank loans. The yields on ABCP
and on regular nonfinancial CP are virtually the same until
July, 2007, when the subprime-induced financial turmoil
broke out in the United States.
34. AA and BBB are bond ratings by S&P, equivalent
to ratings of Aa2 and Baa2 by Moody’s. The mapping
between long- and short-term ratings can be found at http://
federalreserve.gov/releases/cp/about.htm.
35. For reference, the risk premium time series for each
loan category is reported separately in Figure A1.
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to 1.7 percentage points on average over the
period. However, total imputed bank output
would only increase by 6% on average, which
does not materially affect our main results.
The risk premia of consumer installment and
credit card loans are estimated using ML’s ABS
indices for fixed-rate auto and credit card loans,
respectively. A weighted average yield is com-
puted based on the share of credit cards versus
all other loans in the portfolio. The average rat-
ing of the ABS underlying the two indices is
between BBB and AA, as both these indices are
components of ML’s ABS master index.36 Fol-
lowing this procedure almost certainly yields a
rather conservative estimate of the average risk
premium on the consumer loans held on the
books of banks because to receive investment-
grade ratings, the ABS invariably must obtain
credit enhancement to ensure that their holders
will be subject to minimal credit risk.37 More-
over, even at the original loan level, the loans
kept on banks’ books may be riskier than the
ones that are securitized.38 In terms of matu-
rity, however, no data are available to gauge
how well on average the indices’ constituent
bonds match consumer loans held by banks.39
The average duration of these ABS indices is
fairly short, so we compare the average ABS
rate to an average of 1- and 2-yr Treasuries.
We thus obtain an average risk premium of
0.7 percentage points. This is likely a conser-
vative estimate as this is lower than the average
C&I premium of 1.3 percentage points, whereas
contractual rates on consumer loans are on aver-
age much higher than the rates charged on
C&I loans. As a sensitivity check, we also esti-
mated the risk premium based on a BBB-rated
36. We choose not to use a general index for the ABS
market because, between 2003 and the first half of 2007,
a rapidly growing share of the market comprised securities
backed by subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans—from less
than 20% in 2003 to over 30% in 2006, according to the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.
37. Credit enhancement can be obtained in a variety
of ways. It can be purchased from third parties such as
insurance companies, or created “internally” by forming
a sufficient loss-absorbing cushion of junior claims within
the tranche structure “wrapped” around a pool of assets in
a manner that enables the issued ABS can obtain senior
ratings.
38. Using securitization to save on capital requirements
is a form of regulatory arbitrage. This may not be a major
concern; for example, Calomiris and Mason (2004) find little
evidence of this motivation in banks that securitize credit
card loans.
39. As these are indices for fixed-rate ABS, their aver-
age maturity may exceed that of the underlying consumer
loans, some of which carry floating rates.
corporate bond index, which covers the most
risky investment-grade securities.40 This would
increase the average risk premium from 0.7 to
1.8 percentage points and reduce the financial
service output associated with these loans by
20% and total bank output by 7%. Because
the impact on total output is quite modest, we
stick to the risk premium estimate based on
the ABS index as our baseline case. Besides,
there is no concrete information to substanti-
ate that the BBB-rated corporate bond index
is more appropriate as the market reference for
consumer loans.
To estimate the risk premium on real estate
loans, we use the maturity-weighted redemption
yields on MBS issued by government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs, such as Fannie Mae and
Freddy Mac) as the reference rate. The maturity
data are available in the Call Reports (schedule
RC-C) since the second quarter of 1997. Again,
this reference rate likely gives a conservative
estimate of the risk premium on these loans as
agency MBS are not subject to default risk but
only to prepayment risk: mortgage holders may
repay their loans in part or in full ahead of
schedule.41
The real estate loans in bank portfolios have a
repricing period or remaining maturity between
6 and 10 yr in the sample period, so we com-
pare an MBS index with a long remaining
maturity (7–10 yr) to a maturity-matched aver-
age of Treasury yields. The resulting risk pre-
mium is 1.2 percentage points over this period,
as a sensitivity check we again applied the
1.8 percentage points risk premium based on
BBB-rated corporate bonds. This reduced ser-
vice output associated with these loans by
almost 80% and in fact led to negative service
output in one-third of the quarters. This makes
it highly unlikely that banks would use such a
BBB corporate rate as the reference when setting
interest rates on real estate loans.
For the yield on the MBS index to be a
good proxy for the pure (risky) return in the
loan rates, a substantial fraction of the mortgage
40. Non-investment-grade bond indices have yields
much higher than the average rate received on consumer
loans, most likely because of the high default premium (i.e.,
dMt above).
41. None of the conforming residential mortgages that
back the agency MBS carry prepayment penalties; this
amounts to an implicit call option. The option is most likely
to be exercised when the current period mortgage rate falls
below the loan’s contractual interest rate. See, for example,
Dunn and McConnell (1981) or Kau et al. (1992) for the
magnitude and determinants of prepayment risk.
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portfolio must be repriced in the period of
consideration. This timing requirement is made
clear in Equation (9): the reference rate should
be for the period when a loan’s interest rate
was set or last reset.42 To gauge the extent to
which the above baseline estimates are affected
by the interest-rate timing mismatch, a problem
that we suspect is particularly acute for long-
term, fixed-rate loans such as many residential
mortgages, we also compute the risk premium
on real estate loans using a series of moving
averages of current and past (up to 5 yr) market
rates. For the period 2002–2007, the average
service spread on mortgage loans using current
market rates is 0.80%, while that using the 5-yr
moving average rates is 0.69%. Service spreads
estimated using shorter moving averages lie in
between. A maximum effect of 0.11 percentage
points is modest compared to the average service
spread of 0.80, so timing mismatch between
bank loan rates and the market reference rates
is not a major concern for real estate loans.
In summary, except for the two least risky
(minimal- and low-risk) categories of C&I loans,
we lack high-frequency data to accurately esti-
mate the riskiness of the loan portfolios on bank
balance sheet. Therefore, our choices of ref-
erence rates for the other bank loans rely on
the assumption that the systematic risk of each
category of loans is similar to that of the mar-
ket securities based on securitized pools of that
category of loans. On the other hand, our sen-
sitivity analysis suggests that, even apart from
the issue of theoretical justification, raising all
the reference rates to as high as yields on the
lowest investment-grade (i.e., BBB-rated) cor-
porate bonds would not significantly alter the
results reported in the remainder of this paper.
So, hereafter we present only results based on
the reference rates derived above using market
securities structured from securitized loans.
For transaction deposits, which are short-term
and largely default-risk-free debt claims, we use
the 3-mo Treasury bill yield as the reference
rate, which we will refer to as the risk-free rate
in the empirical subsection below. The refer-
ence rate for savings and time deposits is the
average yield on maturity-matched Treasuries.
Its spread over the 3-mo Treasury yield is a term
premium. Similarly, the term premium for each
category of loans is defined as the yield spread
42. There are, of course, timing issues regarding when
the screening or monitoring is done versus when the implicit
revenue is recognized. See WBF (2009) for an in-depth
discussion.
between the loan-maturity-matched Treasuries
and 3-mo Treasury bills. We will show how
much the estimate of bank service output would
be affected even if we only account for the term
premia in loan interest rates but not the risk
premia.
D. New Estimates of the Value of Borrower and
Depositor Services
Given the reference rate for each category
of loans, we now estimate borrower and depos-
itor services. Table 1 is a detailed exposition
using the estimates for the fourth quarter of
2007, comparing our model-based, service-flow
measure of bank output with the measure that
approximates NIPA’s current methodology.43 In
total, it lists five types of services—to holders of
two types of deposit accounts and borrowers of
three types of loans.44 Other categories of assets
and liabilities, such as investment securities
and subordinated debt, are excluded because,
as explained in Section II, their holders do not
receive financial services created by banks.45
Table 1 shows that for 2007:Q4, the risk-
adjusted reference rates on the three types of
loans are at least one percentage point higher
than the risk-free rate. Using the risk-adjusted
reference rates lowers the imputed value of
borrower services by $116.8 billion (from $205
to $88.2 billion). To gauge the impact on GDP,
we net out the value of borrower services to
businesses (i.e., services related to commercial
real estate loans and C&I loans).46 Accordingly,
GDP in 2007:Q4 would be $52.9 billion, or
0.4 percentage points, lower using our risk-
adjusted bank output measure. We suspect that
43. As mentioned before, the NIPA methodology uses
the return on bank Treasury portfolios as their reference
rate, see Fixler et al. (2003). The comparison we make in
Figure 1 is based on similar reasoning though.
44. Among the loan categories covered in the Call
Reports, we consider only those for which reasonably similar
reference securities can be found in the market. So, lease
financing receivables are excluded. Moreover, we include
only loans and deposits made in banks’ domestic offices,
because activities in foreign offices do not contribute to U.S.
GDP. In sum, the four categories in Table 1 account for 90%
of the total balance of loans and leases in 2007.
45. By excluding these, we further reduce our measure
of bank output relative to the NIPA methodology, which
includes other financial assets and liabilities. However, as
shown by Fixler et al. (2003), these sources of imputed
output are quantitatively unimportant.
46. We infer the former from total services related to
real estate loans, based on the simplifying assumption that
the share of services to commercial customers is proportional
to the share of commercial loan balances in total real estate
loans.
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TABLE 1
The Effect of Risk Adjustment: Imputed Output of U.S. Commercial Banks at Current Prices in
2007:Q4 ($billions)


















5,504 152 2.8 3.5 3.5 3.5 39.0 42.5 42.5
Demand deposits 486 0.0 0.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 16.9 16.9 16.9
Time and savings
deposits
5,018 152.2 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 22.1 25.6 25.6
Loans in domestic
offices
5,471 395 7.2 3.5 4.0 5.7 205.0 177.0 83.7
Real estate loans 3,545 235.3 6.6 3.5 4.3 5.8 112.2 84.3 31.5
Consumer loans 804 80.9 10.1 3.5 3.5 4.9 53.0 52.9 41.1
Commercial and
industrial loans
1,123 78.8 7.0 3.5 3.5 6.0 39.8 39.8 11.1
Total 10,975 547 6.6 3.5 3.8 4.6 244.0 219.5 126.2
Notes : “Average balance” is the average of the balance reported on December 31, 2007 and September 30, 2007. “Interest
flow” is the actual interest received or paid within the quarter. “Annualized interest rate” is the interest flow divided by
the average balance and then annualized. The risk-free reference rate is the average 3-mo Treasury yield, the term-adjusted
reference rate is the Treasury yield corresponding to the average maturity of the loans or deposits, and the default- and
term-adjusted rate also includes the default-risk premium. See Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix for details of the Call
Report data items used in constructing these variables.
this figure is on the low end because, as detailed
above, we have adopted conservative estimates
of risk premia to adjust the reference rates for
risk.
Figure 2 plots the respective average risk-
adjusted reference rates for deposits and loans
from 1997:Q2 to 2007:Q4. Throughout the sam-
ple period, the risk plus term premium stays
positive, so the average reference rate for loans
consistently exceeds that for deposits. For com-
parison, Figure 2 also plots the actual average
interest rate paid on deposits and received on
loans, respectively. The quarterly average rate is
calculated as the interest received or paid during
a quarter over the average balance of the corre-
sponding instruments for the quarter.47 It is clear
that the interest rates paid on deposits are on
average more inertial than the risk-free reference
rate, a well-documented, stylized fact in empir-
ical banking studies (e.g., Berger and Hannan
1989). Likewise, the interest rates received on
loans are on average less volatile than the refer-
ence market rates.
47. Table A1 in the Appendix lists the specific data
items used in calculating the average interest rate on each
category of securities, loans, and deposits. Table A2 summa-
rizes major changes, in terms of reporting requirements and
variable definitions, in the Call Reports between 1997 and
2007 and the way they are handled to arrive at harmonized
time series.
Figure 2 also shows that the average loan
rate consistently exceeds the average loan ref-
erence rate, implying a positive service spread
on average. In contrast, the average deposit
rate was higher than the deposit reference rate
between late 2001 and early 2004. This does
not mean that banks provided transaction ser-
vices at a loss as bank customers pay explicit
charges as well. To illustrate: in the years when
imputed output related to deposits was nega-
tive (−$1.4 billion in 2001 and −$6.3 billion
in 2002), the explicit deposit charges amounted
to $29.7 billion (2001) and $31.7 billion (2002).
Furthermore, Flannery (1982) explains negative
margins on deposits as reflecting the quasi-fixed
nature of deposit relationships. That is, depos-
itors are to some degree “locked” into a bank
account because of the costs they would incur
to switch banks; in return, banks implicitly com-
mit to smoothing deposit interest rates.48 Also
note that these negative margins are not a con-
sequence of estimating risk-adjusted reference
rates because the deposit reference rates contain
no risk premia. So, negative interest margins can
well be a feature of the current NIPA method-
ology.49
48. See also Berlin and Mester (1999) on interest rate
smoothing as a feature of relationship banking.
49. In practice, the BEA uses the average return on
Treasuries on bank balance sheets as their overall reference
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In Figure 3 we plot the service spreads for
deposits and loans directly.50 Not surprisingly,
the two spreads frequently move in opposite
directions, as their formulae carry negative signs
(see Equations [6] and [8]), while both actual
rates are more inertial than the respective ref-
erence rate. Furthermore, the spreads appear to
co-move with the business cycle: the deposit-
service spread narrows, while the loan-service
spread widens following monetary easing in
economic downturns, and vice versa. Variations
in the loan-service spread can mostly be traced
to C&I and consumer loans, as the service
spread on real estate loans remains fairly sta-
ble throughout the period (see Figure A2). One
possible explanation for this pattern is that bank
C&I loans become riskier relative to commercial
paper in periods of economic weakness, possibly
because smaller or riskier firms are more likely
to draw on their credit lines in bad times. If this
is the case, then our empirical results underes-
timate the risk premium on C&I loans in such
periods.
rate. However, these Treasuries on average have longer
maturities than deposit accounts.
50. Figure A2 shows the service spread separately for
the three loan categories.
Figure 4 depicts the imputed bank service
income and the compensation for risk.51 Com-
pensation for term risk and default risk rep-
resents the difference between our new
model-implied measure of bank output and
the NIPA’s current measure. Variations over
time in income from the two services echo
those in the two service spreads depicted in
Figure 3. The term-risk compensation too is
time-varying; it rises as the yield curve steep-
ens, and falls as the yield curve flattens. In
comparison, the default-risk compensation is
more stable over time. Especially worth noting
are the last two quarters of 2007. Compensa-
tion for both default and term risk increased
sharply because of the turmoil in financial mar-
kets and the monetary easing that followed in
response.
We note that the output series of implicit bank
services based on our risk-adjusted reference
rates is more volatile than that based on the
51. “Loan services” in the figure corresponds to YA in
Equation (6), and “Deposit services” to YD in Equation (8).
“Default risk compensation” corresponds to the term rAA in
Equation (7). “Term risk compensation” denotes the return
because of maturities longer than 3 mo.
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FIGURE 4
Imputed Output of U.S. Commercial Banks and Risk Compensation at Current Prices,
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Notes: “Deposit services” equals the deposit service spread (cf. Figure 3) times the quarterly average deposit balance (see
equation). “Loan services” equals the loan service spread (cf. Figure 3) times the quarterly average loan balance at all banks
(following equation); “Term risk compensation” denotes the value of the return on loans and deposits due to maturities longer
than 3 months. “Default risk compensation” denotes the value of pure default risk-based return on loans.
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risk-free reference rate.52 Some cite this fact as
basis for objecting to risk adjusting the reference
rates in practice. We argue that this result per se
is little ground for counting risk compensation as
part of bank output, even considering the likely
practical difficulty.
First of all, the volatility of growth rates of
overall risk-adjusted bank output, inclusive of
explicit fees, is on par as a number of other
industries, including the “securities, commod-
ity contracts, and investments” industry.53 So,
while risk-adjusted bank output is more volatile,
it does not seem too volatile for use in the
NIPAs. Second, similar comparisons of volatility
based on euro area data (Colangelo and Inklaar
2009) suggest that more detailed interest rates,
such as those based on surveys conducted in the
euro area (e.g., rates on new business by repric-
ing period) could markedly mitigate volatility
of service spreads. While in our U.S. data the
standard deviation of the overall risk-adjusted
interest margin is more than twice as large as
that based on a risk-free rate, the former is only
20% larger than the latter in a similar compari-
son based on euro area data.
E. Plausibility Checks
So far, we have made the case for using our
measure of bank output on theoretical grounds,
that is, we have explained why the reference
rate used to impute the value of bank service
output should be adjusted for the risk of the
associated financial instrument. By removing
the risk premium, this new measure of output
reduces banks’ operating surplus.54 We now
examine whether or not the lower surplus is
“implausibly small” as Fixler and Reinsdorf
52. Using our risk-adjusted reference rates, the aver-
age interest spread on loans and deposits over this period
is 1.5 percentage points with a standard deviation of
0.5 percentage points, while using a risk-free reference rate
the average is 2.4 percentage points with a standard devia-
tion of 0.2 percentage points.
53. The standard deviation of the annual growth rate
of bank output is compared with standard deviation of the
annual growth rate of industry gross output based on the
BEA “GDP by Industry” dataset, both covering the same
period of 1998–2007 at an annual basis. The standard
deviation of bank output growth was 14%; the standard
deviation of output growth in the “securities, commodity
contracts, and investments” industry was 16%.
54. Operating surplus is defined as value added net
of labor compensation and indirect taxes. As explained
above, part of the “excess” bank operating surplus should
be reallocated to nonfinancial firms that purchase bank
services, while the remainder should be reallocated to
interest payments and receipts of households.
(2006, footnote 6) have asserted in arguing
against risk-adjusted reference rates. We focus
on two indicators, the capital share in value
added and the IRR on fixed capital, as the range
of values of each indicator in other industries
can be viewed, under certain conditions, as the
plausible benchmark for comparison. The capital
share, defined as the share of operating surplus
in industry value added, gives an indication
of the capital intensity of production in that
industry. The IRR is the return an industry or
a firm would need to earn on its fixed capital
assets, such as buildings and computers, to
exactly cover the rental cost of fixed capital.
We must note the close link between the
IRR and the user cost of funds. The latter
is, in fact, simply the former net of deprecia-
tion (consisting of both obsolescence and phys-
ical wear and tear). The concept of a risk-
adjusted user cost in the case of fixed capital
has long been an integral part of investment
theories. The IRR in some industries is consis-
tently higher than in others, even after control-
ling for depreciation and expected changes in
the price of capital goods—precisely because
investing in those industries incurs greater sys-
tematic risk. Investors thus demand a higher
rate of payoff on average, so long as capital is
mobile and the no-arbitrage condition holds. The
risk-based user-cost measure is also routinely
used in industry-level growth accounting stud-
ies.55 We calculate the IRR using the standard
Jorgensonian framework (e.g., Jorgenson, Gol-
lop, and Fraumeni 1987), and capital includes
fixed reproducible assets, such as buildings and
machinery, as well as land and inventories.56
The first step is to gauge by how much our
new measure would revise downward total nom-
inal output of all depository institutions. Total
output equals the sum of explicit bank ser-
vice charges (comprising the bulk of noninter-
est income) and implicit revenue from services
(i.e., our estimate of borrower and depositor ser-
vice output in Table 1 and Figure 3).57 While
imputed bank output is overstated by 45% on
average, total banking output is overstated by
only 21% on average over the sample period
1997:Q2–2007:Q4. Next, we obtain a new out-
put estimate for all depository institutions (i.e.,
55. See, for example, Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni
(1987).
56. Data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
57. Note that we exclude the trading-income elements of
noninterest income, as we argue that it is also not output but
transfer of property income; see Inklaar and Wang (2007)
for further discussion.
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the credit intermediation industry as defined in
the NIPA Industry Account) by assuming that
output of the rest of the industry is overstated by
the same percentage as that of commercial banks
in each year.58 Obviously it would be preferable
to have direct estimates of the overstatement for
both savings banks and credit unions, but that is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Table 2 shows the results of our plausibility
exercise comparing capital shares and internal
rates of return according to the current NIPA
measure versus our new measure of output.
Under the NIPA output measure, the banking
industry’s capital share averages 59%, ranking
it higher than the capital share of the petroleum
refining industry and similar to the share of coal
mining. This seems an implausibly high cap-
ital share, as the other industries with similar
shares are generally regarded as intensive users
of large-scale machinery. The implication is that
the operating surplus may be implausibly large
under the NIPA measure. The new output mea-
sure, by excluding the risk premium, decreases
the capital share of the industry to 42% on aver-
age—the same as the share of private industries
as a whole.59 This is also close to the capital
share of retail trade but higher than that of busi-
ness services.
The IRR of the banking industry, based
on the NIPA measure of output, also seems
implausibly high, at 17.8%, on average, over the
period. In comparison, the IRR for the private
sector as a whole is only 9.3%. The premium of
8 percentage points seems unwarranted by the
systematic risk of the credit intermediaries, as
many of those with publicly traded shares have a
beta around one. Once the new measure of bank
output is used, the resulting lower operating
surplus reduces the IRR of the industry to a level
close to that of the overall private sector.
58. This industry (NAICS 521 and 522) comprises
commercial banks, the Federal Reserve, savings banks, and
credit unions. Commercial banks account for more than
half of the employment. Savings banks, the second largest
category, tend to have a larger share of real estate loans
than commercial banks. Although the risk premium on real
estate loans tends to be somewhat lower than on other loans,
a robustness check that applies the same interest rate margin
by loan category to savings banks leads to similar estimates
of overstatement.
59. Lower bank operating surplus also means lower
operating surplus for the overall private sector. But taking
this into account has only a minimal effect on the values
reported in Table 2 for the private sector. It is also important
to note that we are in all likelihood underestimating the
risk premium, and this means the true capital share of the
banking industry is lower than 42%.
TABLE 2
The Impact of Risk Adjustment on Labor











Private economy 42 9.3
Notes: “Financial intermediation” refers to North Amer-
ican Industrial Classification System (NAICS) industries 521
and 522 in the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s (BEA) GDP
by Industry Account. “Risk-free” and “risk-adjusted” denote
the two measures of bank output that use the risk-free and
the risk-adjusted reference rates (corresponding to the “risk-
free” and “default and term” output columns in Table 1),
respectively. “Private economy” is as defined in the GDP
by Industry Account. The “capital share in value added”
includes an estimate of the labor compensation of self-
employed, assuming they earn the same average wage as
employees. The “internal rate of return on fixed assets” is the
shadow rental rate on the gross capital stock at current prices
that would generate the actual capital compensation (defined
as value added minus labor compensation). All fixed assets
as covered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics are included,
that is, fixed reproducible assets, land and inventories. The
industry-level capital and income data are available annually
for the 1997–2006 period.
Mis-measured capital assets are a far less
plausible reason for the observed gap between
the IRR of the overall private sector and the
financial intermediation industry. It may be
argued that credit intermediaries have built up
more intangible assets than the average pri-
vate industry, for example, through business
reorganization that complements the investment
in information technology (IT).60 However, the
intermediation industry would need to have
an investment share of intangibles nine times
higher than that of the average private industry
to account for the difference in the IRR. This
seems unlikely, as the IT investment share of
banks is only 30% higher than that of the overall
private sector.61
The decrease in the capital share and the IRR
on fixed capital toward a more reasonable level
is an indirect effect of excluding the risk pre-
mium in our new measure of bank output. We
therefore view the results reported in Table 2
60. The BEA counts only software and a few intangibles
as capital. Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2006), among others,
argue that the scope of capital should be expanded to cover
organizational capital, brand capital, etc.
61. Specifically, 34% versus 26% of total investment.
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as empirical support for the new measure, com-
plementing the theoretical argument for risk-
adjusted reference rates.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Banks provide important services to both bor-
rowers and depositors. They reduce the informa-
tion asymmetries that impede borrowers’ access
to credit, and provide transaction services to
depositors. However, banks generally do not
charge explicit fees for these services; instead,
they bundle the fees with loan and deposit
interest flows. As a result, the output value of
both borrower and depositor services must be
imputed. In the statistical and research com-
munity, it is generally agreed that the value of
such implicit bank services is most appropriately
imputed as the difference between the interest
paid on loans (and interest received on deposits)
and the opportunity cost of the associated funds
as determined by a reference rate. The choice
of this reference rate, however, is more con-
tentious. Under the current system of National
Accounts (1993) and in the U.S. NIPA, this ref-
erence rate is stipulated to be a single, risk-free
rate.
In contrast, Wang (2003) and WBF (2009)
show that, in a world with risk-averse investors,
each reference rate should take account of the
nondiversifiable risk of the associated financial
instrument. Specifically, the opportunity cost of
a risky loan is not the return on a risk-free
investment, but rather the return on an invest-
ment of comparable risk. The model in the
work of WBF (2009) is an abstract representa-
tion of reality, assuming, for example, (nearly)
complete and efficient financial markets. Relax-
ing these assumptions would likely affect the
exact risk premium concept that should be incor-
porated into the reference rates, but the core
message of the model should continue to hold:
passively bearing risk that is priced in the market
is not a productive activity.
In this paper, we show that the output mea-
sure implied by the banking model of WBF
(2009) can be implemented for U.S. commercial
banks from 1997 onward. In particular, financial
markets provide data on yields of debt instru-
ments comparable to those held on banks’ bal-
ance sheets, enabling us to derive risk-adjusted
reference rates. We show that removing the
risk premium, the difference between the risk-
adjusted reference rate and the risk-free rate, is
quantitatively important. Comparing bank out-
put calculated using our risk-adjusted reference
rate with output computed using the risk-free
reference rate according to the current NIPA
method, we show that the latter overstates, on
average, imputed bank output by 45%, total
bank output by 21%, and U.S. GDP by 0.3%.
Our risk-adjusted reference rates are not per-
fect, as the bank loan categories for which inter-
est rates are reported separately are quite broad.
As a result, the matching of risk characteristics
between bank loans and comparable publicly
traded debt instruments is imprecise. Nonethe-
less, we would argue that we have captured
some of the risk premium by using conserva-
tive estimates, and that accounting for some of
the risk premium is an improvement over not
accounting for it at all. Furthermore, estimates
of the share of capital in banks’ value added, and
the IRR on fixed capital of the banking industry
also suggest that our measure of bank output is
more plausible than the current NIPA measure.
We conclude by drawing two important
implications of our paper. First, we find no con-
vincing theoretical or practical reasons for using
risk-free reference rates in estimating bank out-
put. Instead, we show that it is feasible to use
risk-adjusted reference rates and that doing so is
quantitatively significant. The fact that our risk-
adjusted measure of bank output is both con-
ceptually preferable and leads to more plausible
outcomes argues strongly for changing current
statistical practice to remove the compensation
for risk-bearing in general from bank output.
Second, information about loan risk rating and
the attendant interest rates charged by U.S. com-
mercial banks is scarce, despite the central role
of risk rating in measuring bank output, as well
as in studying other important banking issues
such as competition in credit supply. We, there-
fore, urge the statistical agencies to improve data
collection in this important area.
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APPENDIX. DETAILS OF DATA AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURES
TABLE A1
Call report items used in calculating commercial bank interest rates
1997Q2–2000Q4 2001Q1–2007Q4
Interest income and expenses
Income on real estate loans RIAD4011+RIAD4246 RIAD4011
Income on consumer loans RIAD4013+RIAD4247+RIAD4248 RIAD4013
Income on commercial and industrial loans RIAD4012 RIAD4012
Expenses on time and savings deposits RIAD0093+RIADA517+RIADA518 RIAD0093+RIADA517+RIADA518
Loan/deposit balance
Real estate loans RCON1410 RCON1410
Credit card loans RCON2008 RCONB538
Other consumer loans RCON2011 RCONB539+RCON2011
Commercial and industrial loans RCON1766 RCON1766
Time and savings deposits RCON2385 RCON2385
Demand deposits RCON2210 RCON2210
Maturity data
Real estate loans (1–4 family) RCONA564-RCONA569 RCONA564-RCONA569
Loans except 1–4 family real estate loans RCFDA570-RCONA575 RCFDA570-RCONA575
Time deposits of less than $100 000 RCONA579-RCONA582 RCONA579-RCONA582
Time deposits of $100 000 or more RCONA584-RCONA587 RCONA584-RCONA587
Notes: Entries refer to the mnemonics used in the Call Reports, listed under the relevant period(s). Data were downloaded
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/financial institution reports/
commercial bank data.cfm). Using the Entity Type Code variable (RSSD9331), only data covering commercial banks were
selected. A bank is included in the loan interest rate calculation only when data on both interest income and the loan balance
are available. This requirement mostly affects banks with less than $25 million in assets, because before 2001 these banks
did not have to provide a breakdown of total interest income by loan category. In 2007, this category of banks represented
around 0.1% of total commercial bank assets.
TABLE A2
Notes on Changes in Variable Definitions in the Call Reports, 1997–2007
Code/Item Note
RIAD4246, RIAD4247, RIAD4248 Up to 2000, small and medium-sized banks used these variables to report their
interest income for the different loan categories. RIAD4249 covers interest
income on Commercial and Industrial loans, but also on all other loans, so this
variable was omitted at the cost of coverage of the industry loan totals. Banks
with fewer than $25 million in assets did not have to report any of these
variables.
RCON2008, RCON2011 Up to 2000, banks with domestic and foreign offices only had to distinguish
between credit card loans and consumer installment loans for the consolidated
bank. Total loans to individuals are available for the bank’s domestic offices. To
increase coverage, the share of credit card loans and of consumer installment
loans was calculated based on the consolidated totals (codes RCFD2008 and
RCFD2011) and applied to the total for the bank’s domestic offices.
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